Secure server-aided top-k monitoring by WANG, Yujue et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Information Systems School of Information Systems
12-2017
Secure server-aided top-k monitoring
Yujue WANG
Guilin University of Electronic Technology
Hwee Hwa PANG
Singapore Management University, hhpang@smu.edu.sg
Yanjiang YANG
Huawei Singapore Research Center
Xuhua DING
Singapore Management University, xhding@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2017.08.068
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research
Part of the Databases and Information Systems Commons, Information Security Commons, and
the Software Engineering Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Systems at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Information Systems by an authorized administrator of
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
WANG, Yujue; PANG, Hwee Hwa; YANG, Yanjiang; and DING, Xuhua. Secure server-aided top-k monitoring. (2017). Information
Sciences. 420, 345-363. Research Collection School Of Information Systems.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/3789
Information Sciences 420 (2017) 345–363 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Information Sciences 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ins 
Secure server-aided top-k monitoring 
Yujue Wang a , b , ∗, HweeHwa Pang b , Yanjiang Yang c , Xuhua Ding b 
a Guangxi Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Information Security, School of Computer Science and Information Security, Guilin 
University of Electronic Technology, Guilin 541004, China 
b School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore 188065, Singapore 
c Huawei Singapore Research Center, Singapore 
a r t i c l e i n f o 
Article history: 
Received 29 November 2016 
Revised 19 May 2017 
Accepted 20 August 2017 
Available online 23 August 2017 
Keywords: 
Privacy 
Veriﬁability 
Collusion-resistance 
Correlation computation 
Vector product 
a b s t r a c t 
In a data streaming model, a data owner releases records or documents to a set of users 
with matching interests, in such a way that the match in interest can be calculated from 
the correlation between each pair of document and user query. For scalability and avail- 
ability reasons, this calculation is delegated to third-party servers, which gives rise to the 
need to protect the integrity and privacy of the documents and user queries. In this paper, 
we propose a server-aided data stream monitoring scheme ( DSM ) to address the aforemen- 
tioned integrity and privacy challenges, so that the users are able to verify the correlation 
scores obtained from the server. The scheme provides strong security protection, even in 
the event of collusion between the server and other users. We also offer techniques to 
bound the computation demand in decoding the correlation scores, and we demonstrate 
the practicality of the scheme through experiments with real data. 
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
With the rapid advances in communication technology and widespread adoption of mobile devices and RFID technology, 
there is an increasing number of data streaming applications, for example, Web access analysis, proﬁle-driven marketing, 
environment sensing, stock trading and online bidding [5] . Such applications can generate high volumes of data, which 
are often streamed to an intermediary (i.e., a Server ) for query processing and analysis to produce aggregate results for 
end-user consumption. 
In this paper, we consider a data streaming system that comprises a data Owner , one or more Server s, and multiple 
User s. User s express their interests as query vectors q that are stored at the Server . Whenever the Owner wants to release 
a document, he generates a document vector d and provides it to the Server . With d , the Server computes the match 
between d and each permitted q , in the form of a protected correlation coeﬃcient v = q · d , and returns v to the issuing 
User . The User then extracts the correlation score. The beneﬁts of having the Server rather than the User compute the 
correlation score are twofold. First, it signiﬁcantly reduces Server - User communication cost, since the User only receives 
a score rather than the entire document vector. Second, it facilitates access enforcement over the user queries. For instance, 
low privilege users may not be allowed to search on certain features within the document vector. As the Server may not be 
trusted by the Owner or the User s, both documents and user queries need to be in encoded form to protect their privacy 
and integrity. 
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In the data stream security literature, veriﬁability and privacy are generally addressed separately. The former includes 
[16] which allows users to verify the arrival, removal and update of data falling within a selection range on an attribute, 
and [10] for authenticating selection-aggregation queries over an attribute of interest. Privacy in data streaming has been 
achieved through randomization [1] and anonymization [2] . In cryptography, there is predicate encryption that supports 
the inner product of two vectors, e.g., [9] . However, predicate encryption schemes are not applicable to our data streaming 
model in which the document vector d and query vector q are generated by different parties and must be kept secret from 
each other. 
The only existing scheme that simultaneously guarantees the integrity and privacy of documents and queries in a server- 
aided data streaming model is our earlier study in [5] . That work proposes a veriﬁable and private scheme for matching 
document vectors with query vectors. It is not secure against Server - User collusion though. Also, the scheme is built on 
composite bilinear group and incurs very high computation costs. 
1.1. Our contributions 
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving, veriﬁable and collusion-resistant server-aided data stream monitoring 
( DSM ) system that matches documents d with queries q on their inner product scores q ·d with the help of a server. 
In a DSM scheme, the documents d and standing queries q are encoded by the Owner and User s, respectively. The Owner 
does not need to retain any information about the documents after distributing them to the Server , while a User holds 
only some tag information of his queries. With this limited information, it is very challenging to realize veriﬁability at the 
User side, in such a way that the User could successfully recover q ·d from the Server ’s encoded result without interacting 
with the Owner , while leaking no information to the Server . To ﬁlter out documents with low inner product scores, the 
User is able to set a threshold or bound on q ·d , so that only the k highest scores need to be recovered, thus achieving 
top-k monitoring. 
To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the ﬁrst for the data streaming model that concurrently achieves strong 
integrity, privacy, veriﬁability and collusion-resistance protection. In particular, our DSM scheme achieves all the security 
features of [5] and more, including: 
• Integrity guarantee on documents and queries : Although the Server holds all the encoded documents and standing 
queries, it cannot tamper with them and generate an encoded result for a given pair of document and query, in a way 
that still leads the User to extract a valid result value. 
• Collusion-resistance against the Server and User s : Even if the Server colludes with some users, they can neither learn 
the content of the standing queries of other User s, nor temper with them to yield valid results. In addition, they cannot 
tamper with the encoded documents. 
• Clear monitoring target : The User s can check whether an extracted result q ·d is associated with a fresh document d . 
In this sense, the Server cannot fool the User s by (re-)sending an old result. 
Our scheme is general enough to accommodate the most common document-query matching measures: Both Pearson 
coeﬃcient and Spearman coeﬃcient can be computed as an inner product of the two vectors concerned if their coordinates 
are centered around the mean and normalized beforehand. Likewise, the cosine similarity measure is the product of two 
normalized vectors. Moreover, our scheme is constructed on bilinear group with prime order, which is much faster com- 
putationally than the composite bilinear group used in [5] . We conﬁrm the performance differentiation through extensive 
experiments involving real datasets. The experiments also demonstrate the practicality of our DSM scheme for a broad 
spectrum of applications. 
1.2. Applications 
There are potentially many server-aided data stream monitoring applications. For example, in a surveillance scenario [5] , 
the Owner operates various security checkpoints of a country or sensitive installation. A picture of the face is taken of each 
visitor passing through a checkpoint. From the picture, a feature vector of the relative position, size and shape of the eyes, 
nose, cheeks, jaw, etc. is automatically extracted. The feature vector forms a document d that is streamed to a shared Server , 
along with the document identiﬁer and possibly other sanitized meta-data. One of the User s is an intelligence agency that 
is monitoring a list of subjects. The agency extracts a feature vector from the picture of each subject, and registers it with 
the Server as a standing query q . The Server computes the correlation score between d and q , and returns the score along 
with the document identiﬁer to the agency. The documents that best match the queries are displayed on the agency’s alert 
screen. 
Another application of the data streaming model is social network monitoring. Here, q represents the proﬁle of a User , 
which might capture the frequency that he uses certain services or visits certain sites, as well as his ratings for certain 
products. The User wishes to monitor his ‘closest’ friends who are online at the Server at any time, as determined by the 
correlation between q and the proﬁle d of each friend who comes online. While the User and his friends are willing to 
facilitate computing the correlation between their proﬁles, for privacy reasons they will not release their detailed proﬁles 
directly to each other or the Server . 
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Table 1 
Properties of existing security schemes for data streaming model. 
Scheme Query Document Result Collusion 
Privacy Privacy Veriﬁability Resistance 
Random noise injection [1] No Yes No No 
Data condensation [2] No Yes No No 
Classiﬁer training on data stream [20] No Yes No No 
Keyword search on ﬁle stream [4] , [14] Yes No No No 
Authenticate streamed data [16] No No Yes No 
Authenticate selection-aggregation queries [10] No No Yes No 
Authenticate aggregation functions [13] No No Yes No 
Public key predicate encryption [9] Yes No No No 
Symmetric key predicate encryption [18] Yes Yes No No 
Authenticate linear algebra queries [15] No No Yes No 
Cryptographic veriﬁable and private top- k monitoring [5] Yes Yes Yes No 
This paper Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The third application is document ﬁltering. Consider an entrepreneur ( User ) who wishes to monitor potential compe- 
tition to a product that he is building. He registers his interest, in the form of a standing search query q , with a business 
intelligence publisher like Informa ( Owner ). To support its global clientele, the publisher streams its business news and 
market analysis reports d through third-party Server s situated in different geographical regions. Whenever a new report 
is published, one of the servers would evaluate the report’s relevance to the standing query, and send the report summary 
along with a relevance score to the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur would likely set a score threshold on his client software 
to ﬁlter out irrelevant reports, and read only those summaries with high relevance scores to decide whether to purchase 
the full reports from the publisher. In this application, document privacy allows the documents to be queried while keeping 
their content private until purchased by the users. Concurrently, users are assured that their queries (which reﬂect their 
interest) remain private, and that they will not be misled into disregarding relevant documents due to the document scores 
being manipulated by competitors or compromised servers. 
1.3. Related work 
Data stream security has been studied extensively in various research communities. Table 1 summarizes the characteris- 
tics of the most relevant ones in terms of query/document privacy, result veriﬁability and collusion resistance. 
In [11] , Lindner and Meier discuss general security concerns in architecting a data stream management system. Other 
studies have sought to provide targeted security protection for data streams in speciﬁc contexts. To safeguard the privacy of 
data streams, [1] proposes to inject randomized noise. The condensation scheme in [2] to achieve anonymization supports 
incremental update, and is applicable to data streams. Xu et al. [20] considers how to train a classiﬁer on input streams that 
are private. Bethencourt et al. [4] and Ostrovsky and Skeith [14] introduce protocols for a server to search a stream for ﬁles 
that contain given query keywords; the protocols protect the privacy of the query, but not the data stream. 
Veriﬁability has been addressed in a different group of studies. They include [16] which allows users to verify the arrival, 
removal and update of data falling within a selection range, [10] for authenticating selection-aggregation queries over an at- 
tribute of interest, and [13] for verifying the output of aggregation functions like MAX and SUM. In network communication, 
studies such as [7,17] have addressed how to verify the authenticity of stream data in the presence of packet loss. None of 
the above schemes support the correlation computation that we need. Moreover, they provide veriﬁability but not privacy 
protection. 
Among existing cryptographic protocols, the ones that support inner product, which is what the common correlation 
coeﬃcients entail, are most relevant to our problem setting. The rest of this section focuses on those schemes and explains 
why they do not meet our requirements. 
In the predicate encryption scheme proposed in [9] , an entity possessing a secret key token associated with a vector x 
can decrypt a public key encrypted ciphertext associated with another vector y on the condition that x · y = 0 . The scheme 
is not suitable for our data streaming model because it does not protect the privacy of x against the token holder (the 
Server in our context); this is because the Server can produce the ciphertext for any chosen y with the public key in order 
to match against x . Our model requires the privacy of both vectors against the Server . 
The above privacy issue is addressed by the symmetric-key predicate encryption scheme in [18] . Here, generation of 
both the secret token for x and the ciphertext associated with y require secret inputs; this prevents the token holder from 
generating ciphertext for his chosen y . However, this scheme requires a one-to-one mapping between the secrets used for 
encrypting x and y , whereas our data streaming model requires a one-to-many mapping as the Owner ’s data stream serves 
multiple User s simultaneously. 
Neither the symmetric-key nor public-key predicate encryption scheme supports veriﬁability. The only way for the User 
to verify a computation is to repeat it on his own, and compare with the inner product returned by the Server . More- 
over, recovering the actual value of the inner product involves performing a discrete logarithm in a huge domain which is 
computationally infeasible. 
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Fig. 1. DSM System Model. 
In [15] , Papadopoulos et al. reported an interesting scheme for authenticating linear algebra queries over data streams. 
The setting involves multiple sources that stream data to an outsourced server, and users who register queries over the data 
streams with the server; the sources and users are assumed to be trusted and share a common secret key. Periodically, the 
server reports the query results to the users, coupled with authentication proofs. Supported query operations include vector 
sum, dot product, and matrix product. The scheme does not hide the data from the server. 
Ding et al. [5] proposes a scheme for an untrusted server to compute the inner product of an encrypted document vector 
and an encrypted query vector. The scheme achieves query privacy, document privacy as well as result veriﬁability, but it is 
vulnerable to collusion between the server and other users. Computationally, the scheme requires bilinear groups with an 
order that is the product of two large prime numbers, and hence is very expensive. 
Our problem setting is also related to privacy-preserving scalar product schemes such as [6,21] . These schemes are built 
on an interactive protocol in which two parties, each holding a secret input, co-compute the scalar product without revealing 
their inputs to each other. They do not permit the computation to be carried out by an untrusted intermediary (the Server ) 
though, a key requirement of our data streaming model. There is also no provision to check whether the scalar product is 
computed correctly. 
1.4. Paper organization 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce the DSM system architecture and security require- 
ments in Section 2 . The framework and the corresponding security model are formalized in Section 3 . Section 4 introduces 
our DSM scheme and proves its security. Section 5 explains how DSM may be enhanced to achieve query privacy against 
the data Owner . Section 6 then discusses optimizations that shorten the execution time incurred by the users. In Section 7 , 
we evaluate the DSM scheme both analytically and empirically. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. System model 
2.1. System architecture 
A DSM system, depicted in Fig. 1 , comprises a data Owner , one or more Server s, and multiple User s. Each User 
should register with the Owner to seek permission to monitor the documents published by the Owner . After registration, 
the User s would have no more direct communication with the Owner . Each User encodes her standing query vectors to 
safeguard their privacy and integrity; the encoded query vectors are lodged with the Server . Whenever the Owner has a 
document to release, he generates for it an encoded document vector which is distributed to the Server . Upon receiving 
a new document vector d , the Server computes an encoded result R of the correlation coeﬃcient q ·d for each query q , 
and returns R to the issuing User . The User then decodes the output to obtain and verify the correlation score. The User 
is able to perform top-k monitoring to discard low scores without recovering them. The correlation score may reﬂect the 
similarity or association between q and d , which depends on the application scenario. For example, in the surveillance 
scenario elaborated in Section 1.2 , the correlation score measures the match between the pictures of a monitored subject 
and visitors. Based on this score, the k best matching visitor pictures at any time would be highlighted to the agency. In the 
system, the Server would always respond to all qualiﬁed User s when a fresh document is published to the Server . 
We assume that temporary secure channels from the Owner to User and from the Owner to Server are available 
during the registration phase for transmitting the user key and server-side key. The Server implements access policies over 
the user queries, which may restrict each User to issuing fewer than some maximum m standing queries for matching 
against the same document, and also limit each User to accessing certain parts of the published documents (as explained 
in Section 1 ). Our DSM system does not require the ServPro procedure to perform any semantic/sanity checks on encoded 
standing queries and documents, whereas semantic/sanity checking is an independent problem. That is, our DSM scheme 
only requires that all the procedures work well when the standing queries and documents are correctly formulated, i.e., they 
are represented as vectors on ﬁnite ﬁeld. 
2.2. Adversary model and security goals 
As the Server and the other users in the system may be administrated by outsourced service providers whose operators 
do not have appropriate security clearances, the system must be secure against any Server - User collusion. That is, in a 
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DSM system, the adversary could be a Server , acting in collusion with corrupted users, that executes the protocol hon- 
estly but is curious to know the document features and user queries, or cheats in computing the correlation scores where 
the corresponding standing queries and documents may have been tampered with. Accordingly, the security requirements 
against the Server - User collusion are enumerated below, whereas Server - Owner collusion will be discussed in Section 5 . 
• Query privacy and integrity . The values in q must be known only to the particular User who issued it, and guarded 
against any collusion between the Server and other users. For example, a surveillance application should guarantee that 
an adversary cannot match feature vectors extracted from his own pictures against q to discover who the intelligence 
agency is monitoring. 
• Document privacy and integrity . The values in d must not be revealed to the Server , so as to prevent an adversary from 
matching d against his own queries. 1 Document integrity should be preserved against Server - User collusion attacks. For 
example, in surveillance applications, to safeguard the rights of the visitors who have their pictures taken, users of the 
system must be explicitly authorized by the Owner before they can query over d . 
• Result privacy . The correlation score between d and q should be available only to the issuing User . With or without other 
colluding users, the Server that computes the score cannot be allowed to deduce the query result. 
• Result veriﬁability . Without direct access to d , the User who issued q would want to verify the correlation score between 
d and q . This is to prevent the Server and other colluding users from manipulating d, q or the query processing to 
suppress certain documents from the User . 
Remark 1. We elaborate further on a few key properties of the DSM system. 
(1) The User s need to receive one message for every document. This cannot be avoided because query privacy prevents 
the Owner / Server from computing the correlation score and ﬁltering low-scoring documents. The model reduces 
data traﬃc to the User as long as the document vector is larger than the encrypted correlation score. 
(2) The Owner is trusted by the User s. This is reasonable because the User s are consuming documents generated by the 
Owner . Nevertheless, for those rare situations where the Owner may be curious about the User queries, we propose 
a variation of our solution that provides query privacy against even the Owner . 
(3) Resistance against Server - User collusion. Even if the Server colludes with enough User s, the most that they can 
learn is the content of the document vectors. Query privacy, as well as integrity of the correlation scores, remain 
intact. 
3. Deﬁnitions 
3.1. Framework of DSM system 
A data stream monitoring ( DSM ) system involves three types of entities – Owner , User and Server . Formally, a DSM 
scheme consists of the following six procedures. 
• Setup (1  , m ) → (pk, sk ) : On input 1  where  is a security parameter, and dimensionality m of the query and document 
vectors, the set-up algorithm, which is carry out by the Owner , generates a pair of public/secret keys ( pk, sk ). 
• UserReg (pk, sk ) → (uk, ssk u ) : On input a pair of public/secret keys ( pk, sk ), the user registration algorithm, which is car- 
ried out by the Owner , outputs for the User a user key uk and a matching server-side key ssk u that is given to the 
Server . 
• QueryGen (pk , uk , q ) → (Q u , T q ) : On input a public key pk , a user key uk and a standing query q where the coordinates 
reﬂect the User ’s interests, the query generation algorithm, which is run by the User , outputs an encoded query Q u and 
a secret parameter T q for q . 
• DocGen (pk , sk , d ) → ˜ D : On input a pair of public/secret keys ( pk, sk ) and a document vector d , the document generation 
algorithm, which is carried out by the Owner , outputs a processed document ˜ D which contains an encoded document 
vector D and an unique identiﬁer id d , and may also contain some other parameters related to d . 
• ServPro ( ˜  D , ssk u , Q u ) → R : On input a processed document ˜ D , a server-side key ssk u and an encoded query Q u , the server 
processing algorithm, which is carried out by the Server , outputs an encoded query result R on q and d for the issuing 
User . 
• UserDec (pk , uk , R , T q ) → v / ⊥ : On input a public key pk , a user key uk , an encoded query result R and a secret parameter 
T q , the user decoding algorithm, which is run by the User , outputs a query result v = q · d or ⊥ . 
Usage of DSM algorithms : Fig. 2 depicts how the DSM procedures are invoked. The Owner , who is the document 
publisher, ﬁrst runs Setup to generate his own secret key and to initialize the system setting shared by all participants. 
To join the system, a User should register with the Owner . The Owner executes UserReg to produce a secret that the 
1 With query privacy protection, a user could formulate queries to elicit individual feature values in d . That is, when a user colludes with the Server or 
some other users, they can issue m queries q i for i ∈ [1, m ] and get correlation scores v i , where m denotes the dimensionality of the query and document 
vectors; then they would be able to deduce all the values in d by solving the system of equations q i · d = v i . Hence document privacy is not achievable 
against colluding users. 
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Fig. 2. A procedure of DSM scheme. 
User utilizes to encode her queries, and a secret that enables the Server to process those queries. Based on her interest, 
the User runs QueryGen to generate the encoding Q u of her query q and deposits Q u with the Server , and locally retains 
secret parameter T q . No two users share the same secret. This ensures that encoded queries are user-speciﬁc. 
At runtime, the Owner generates a stream of documents as well as their document vectors. For each new document 
vector d , the Owner runs DocGen to produce a processed document ˜ D for the Server ; ˜ D is common to all the User s in 
the system. The Server then executes ServPro on ˜ D for each registered query Q u and returns the encoded correlation score 
R to the corresponding User . On receiving the response, the User runs UserDec with her secret to recover v within some 
target range. In top- k monitoring, the User only wants the k highest ranking documents, so the target range is bounded 
from below by the score of the k th ranked document. Thus, top-k monitoring actually improves the eﬃciency of UserDec . 
We will provide constraints that bound the search space for v , so that its decoding is computationally eﬃcient. 
When all the entities in the DSM system are honest, it should always output the correct query result. 
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Correctness) . A DSM scheme is correct if, for any security parameter  ∈ N , any dimensionality m ∈ N , any 
key pair (pk, sk ) ← Setup (1  , m ) , any user registration (uk, ssk u ) ← UserReg (pk, sk ) , any encoded standing query (Q u , T q ) ← 
QueryGen (pk , uk , q ) for q , and any processed document ˜ D ← DocGen (pk , sk , d ) for d , we have UserDec (pk , uk , R , T q ) = q · d 
for the server-generated encoded query result R ← ServPro ( ˜  D , ssk u , Q u ) . 
3.2. Security deﬁnitions 
We proceed to deﬁne security models to achieve the security goals described in Section 2.2 . Our DSM system involves 
a computation Server , which is similar to existing outsourcing/veriﬁable computation schemes. Thus, we follow the stan- 
dard framework established for these schemes (e.g., [19,22] ) to deﬁne the security model for integrity of user queries and 
documents. 
In a secure DSM system, even when the Server colludes with a set U of users, it cannot tamper with an encoded 
standing query Q u outsourced by a honest User without being caught. In other words, if some Q u issued by a honest User 
has been tampered with, it can be detected by this User so that the UserDec algorithm would output ⊥ to indicate a 
failure; if Q u remains intact, then UserDec must output the expected value v . Formally, the integrity of encoded standing 
query Q u is captured by the following security game Game 
q - int 
A between a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A 
and a challenger C. Adversary A controls the Server and all User s in the corrupted set U , whereas challenger C simulates 
the Owner and all the honest User s. 
Setup : With security parameter  and dimensionality m , the challenger C runs Setup (1  , m ) to get a pair of public/secret 
keys ( pk, sk ). For each user in U , the challenger runs UserReg (pk, sk ) to generate a user key uk i and a server-side key ssk i . It 
gives pk and { ssk i } U to A . 
Queries : In this phase, adversary A adaptively poses the following queries. Challenger C maintains query lists that record 
all the queries and responses. 
• Query generation queries : Adversary A requests an encoded query vector for a standing query q l, i on behalf of some 
user U l ∈ U . If U l does not exist in the query list, the challenger runs UserReg (pk, sk ) to generate a user key uk l and a 
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server-side key ssk l ; otherwise C retrieves uk l and ssk l generated previously for U l . Following that, the challenger runs 
Q l , i ← QueryGen (pk , uk l , q l , i ) , then sends Q l, i and ssk l to A . 
• Document generation queries : Adversary A requests a processed document for d j . The challenger runs ˜ D j ← 
DocGen (pk , sk , d j ) and sends ˜ D j to A . 
• Decoding queries : Adversary A generates an encoded query result R l,i, j for user U l ’s standing query q l, i and document d j , 
and sends R l,i, j to C. The challenger responds with a result v l, i, j or ⊥ by running UserDec (pk, uk l , R l,i, j , T q l , i ) . 
Output : Eventually, the adversary outputs a pair of indices ( ˆ i , ˆ  l ) that corresponds to query q ˆ l , ˆ i of user U ˆ l ∈ U in the query 
list and wins the game if it can forge the correlation score between q ˆ l , ˆ i and a document in a round of data monitoring. That 
is, the challenger randomly picks a fresh document d , generates ˜ D ← DocGen (pk , sk , d ) and sends ˜ D to A , and the adversary 
responds with R ′ such that: 
UserDec (pk, uk ˆ l , R 
′ 
, T q ˆ l, ˆ i )  = UserDec (pk, uk ˆ l , R , T q ˆ l, ˆ i ) 
where R ← ServPro ( ˜  D , ssk ˆ l , Q ˆ l , ˆ i ) is generated with information that C maintains locally. 
Let Prob 
q - int 
A be the probability that adversary A wins security game Game q - int A , taken over the coin tosses made by both 
A and C. 
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Integrity of User Queries) . A DSM scheme guarantees the integrity of user queries against the Server and 
colluding users if, for any PPT adversary A who carries out security game Game q - int A with a challenger C, there exists a 
negligible function ( · ) such that Prob q - int A ≤ (1  ) . 
Also, when the Server colludes with a set U of users, to them the processed queries produced by other users should still 
be indistinguishable from each other. 
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Privacy of User Queries) . A DSM scheme preserves the privacy of user queries against a colluding Server 
and a set U of users if, for any  ∈ N , any dimensionality m ∈ N and any public/secret key pair (pk, sk ) ← Setup (1  , m ) , any 
registration (uk, ssk u ) ← UserReg (pk, sk ) of a honest User , the following two distributions of any two standing queries q 1 
and q 2 appear identical to the colluding Server and users: {
Q 1 : 
( uk i , ssk i ) ← UserReg (pk, sk ) for each U i ∈ U 
( Q 1 , T q 1 ) ← QueryGen (pk , uk , q 1 ) 
}
≈
{
Q 2 : 
( uk i , ssk i ) ← UserReg (pk, sk ) for each U i ∈ U 
( Q 2 , T q 2 ) ← QueryGen (pk , uk , q 2 ) 
}
We continue to formalize the security requirements for published documents. In a secure DSM system, the Server 
cannot forge or tamper with a processed document ˜ D of the Owner by colluding with a set U of users without being 
caught. In other words, if some ˜ D issued by the Owner has been tampered with, it can be detected by the registered User s 
so that the UserDec algorithm would output ⊥ to indicate a failure; if ˜ D is used in ServPro without being changed, then 
UserDec must output the expected value v . Formally, the integrity of processed document ˜ D is captured by the following 
security game Game d - int A between a PPT adversary A and a challenger C. Similar to Game q - int A , adversary A controls the 
Server and all User s in the corrupted set U , whereas challenger C simulates the Owner and all the honest User s. 
Setup : The same as in Game 
q - int 
A . 
Queries : The same as in Game 
q - int 
A . 
Output : Eventually, the adversary outputs a tuple ( R ′ , id d ˆ i , 
ˆ j , ˆ  l ) , which indicates the adversary forges a processed docu- 
ment for a queried d ˆ i , and R 
′ is an encoded result for d ˆ i and q ˆ l , ˆ j in the query list. The adversary wins the game if: 
UserDec (pk , uk , R ′ , T q ˆ l, ˆ j )  = UserDec (pk , uk , R , T q ˆ l, ˆ j ) 
where R ← ServPro ( ˜  D ˆ i , ssk ˆ l , Q ˆ l , ˆ j ) is generated with information that C maintains locally. 
Let Prob 
d - int 
A be the probability that adversary A wins security game Game d - int A , taken over the coin tosses made by both 
A and C. 
Deﬁnition 3.4 (Integrity of Documents) . A DSM scheme guarantees the integrity of documents against the Server and 
colluding users if, for any PPT adversary A who carries out security game Game d - int A with a challenger C, there exists a 
negligible function ( · ) such that Prob d - int A ≤ (1  ) . 
Similarly, in a DSM scheme, the processed documents should be indistinguishable to the Server , even though it holds 
a server-side key. 
Deﬁnition 3.5 (Privacy of Documents) . A DSM scheme preserves the privacy of documents against the Server if, for any 
 ∈ N , any dimensionality m ∈ N and any public/secret key pair (pk, sk ) ← Setup (1  , m ) , any user registration (uk, ssk u ) ← 
UserReg (pk, sk ) , the following two distributions of any two documents d 1 and d 2 appear identical to the Server : {
D 1 : ˜ D 1 ← DocGen (pk , sk , d 1 ) 
}
≈
{
D 2 : ˜ D 2 ← DocGen (pk , sk , d 2 ) 
}
Clearly, if query privacy is protected against the colluding Server and users in a DSM system, then result privacy would 
also be achieved. Also, result veriﬁability is a basic functionality of a secure DSM system that requires no formalization. 
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Table 2 
Notation. 
Symbol Meaning 
d Document vector 
k d Bit length of each coordinate in d 
q Query vector 
k q Bit length of each coordinate in q 
m Dimensionality of d and q 
m q Number of coordinates that the User speciﬁed in q 
v v = q · d is the score of d given q 
G , G T Cyclic groups with bilinear mapping ˆ e : G ×G → G T 
p Large prime number that is the order of G and G T 
H (.) A one-way, collision-resistant hash function 
4. Privacy-Preserving, veriﬁable and collusion-Resistant scheme 
This section introduces our privacy-preserving, veriﬁable and collusion-resistant DSM scheme. Table 2 summarizes the 
frequently used notations, which will be explained as they are used. 
Our DSM scheme is constructed on bilinear groups. Let G be a cyclic group of order p with generator g . A bilinear map 
is a mapping ˆ e : G ×G → G T , where G T is a cyclic group of order p , with the following properties: 
• Bilinearity: ∀ u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z , ˆ e(u a , v b ) = ˆ e(u, v ) ab . 
• Computability: ∀ u, v ∈ G , ˆ e(u, v ) can be computed eﬃciently, in complexity that is polynomial in log p . 
• Non-degeneracy: ˆ e(g, g)  = 1 . 
4.1. Solution construction 
In our system, document vectors and query vectors contain m coordinates each. In any document or query vector, a large 
number of coordinates are expected to be zero. Special precaution is needed to ensure an adversary cannot deduce that two 
coordinates in a vector have zero values. To this end, 4 m + 4 and 2 m random values are respectively used in processing a 
standing query and a document with dimensionality m . 
A round of document monitoring involves three steps, i.e., document generation (by the Owner ) – Server processing 
– User decoding. Thus, the User has no direct communication with the Owner , and receives only the encoded query 
result R from the Server for the fresh document d . With R , the User must be able to decode v = q · d and verify its 
correctness. On one hand, we let the Owner sign the parameters of each published document d . The signature χd is sent 
to the Server and then forwarded to the User . The unforgeability and veriﬁability of χd ensure that the Server cannot 
tamper with those parameters. On the other hand, each query q and document d are encoded into two independent parts 
(i.e., ({ Q i, 1 , · · · , Q i, 4 } m i =1 , Q 9 ) and ({ Q i, 5 , · · · , Q i, 8 } m i =1 , Q 10 ) , ({ D i, 1 , · · · , D i, 4 } m i =1 , D 9 ) and ({ D i, 5 , · · · , D i, 8 } m i =1 , D 10 ) , respectively), 
so that the Server ’s encoded query result R would also contain two independent elements W 1 and W 2 . The result v = q · d 
is valid only if both W 1 and W 2 decode to v . 
We now present our construction. 
Setup (1  , m ) : Choose a bilinear mapping ˆ e : G ×G → G T , where G = 〈 g〉 and G T are cyclic groups of prime order p . Ran- 
domly select θ ∈ R Z ∗p and a collision-resistant hash function H : { 0 , 1 } ∗ → Z ∗p . Randomly pick distinct σi, j ∈ R Z ∗p for 1 ≤ i ≤m 
and 1 ≤ j ≤6, and α j ∈ R Z ∗p for 1 ≤ j ≤4. Pick a signature scheme S = (KeyGen , Sign , Verify) and invoke (tpk , tsk ) ← S. KeyGen . 
Thus, the private key is sk = (θ, { σi, 1 , · · · , σi, 6 } m i =1 , { α j } 4 j=1 , tsk ) and the public key is pk = ( G , G T , ˆ  e, p, g, H, tpk ) . 
UserReg (pk, sk ) : Randomly select a u ∈ R Z ∗p and compute b u = θ − a u mod p, u = g a u and 	u = g b u . Compute g 1 /σi, j for 
1 ≤ i ≤m and 1 ≤ j ≤6, and compute g 1 /α j for 1 ≤ j ≤4. Thus, ssk u = 	u and uk = (u , { g 1 /σi, 1 , · · · , g 1 /σi, 6 } m i =1 , { g 1 /α j } 4 j=1 ) . 
QueryGen (pk , uk , q ) : For a query vector q = { q i } m i = 1 where q i ∈ [0 , 2 k q ) ⊆ Z p , randomly select τ1 , τ2 , τ3 , τ4 ∈ R Z ∗p , and 
μi, j ∈ R Z ∗p for 1 ≤ i ≤m and 1 ≤ j ≤4. For 1 ≤ i ≤m , compute 
Q i, 1 = g (τ1 q i + τ2 + μi, 1 ) /σi, 1 , Q i, 2 = g μi, 1 /σi, 2 
Q i, 3 = g (τ1 q i + τ2 + μi, 2 ) /σi, 3 , Q i, 4 = g μi, 2 /α1 
Q i, 5 = g (τ3 q i + τ4 + μi, 3 ) /σi, 4 , Q i, 6 = g μi, 3 /σi, 5 
Q i, 7 = g (τ3 q i + τ4 + μi, 4 ) /σi, 6 , Q i, 8 = g μi, 4 /α2 
as well as 
Q 9 = g τ2 /α3 and Q 10 = g τ4 /α4 . 
Thus, Q u = ({ Q i , 1 , · · · , Q i , 8 } m i = 1 , Q 9 , Q 10 ) and T q = (τ1 , · · · , τ4 , 
∑ m 
i =1 q i , 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 1 , 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 3 ) . 
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DocGen (pk , sk , d ) : For each document vector d = { d i } m i = 1 where d i ∈ [0 , 2 k d ) ⊆ Z p , randomly select r ∈ R Z ∗p and compute 
C = g r . Randomly pick β1 , β2 ∈ R Z ∗p and h ∈ R G , and compute 
E 1 = ˆ e(h, g) , E 2 = ˆ e(h, g) β1 and E 3 = ˆ e(h, g) β2 . 
Randomly pick a unique identiﬁer id d ∈ R Z ∗p and, for 1 ≤ j ≤4, compute φ j = H(id d ‖ j‖ ˆ e(C, g θ )) , followed by 
χd = S. Sign tsk (id d ‖ C‖ φ1 ‖ · · · ‖ φ4 ‖ E 1 ‖ E 2 ‖ E 3 ) 
Randomly choose λi, 1 , λi, 2 ∈ R Z ∗p for 1 ≤ i ≤m . For 1 ≤ i ≤m , compute 
D i, 1 = h σi, 1 (d i + λi, 1 + φ1 ) , D i, 2 = h σi, 2 (d i + λi, 1 + φ2 ) 
D i, 3 = h σi, 3 λi, 1 , D i, 4 = h α1 λi, 1 
D i, 5 = h σi, 4 (d i + λi, 2 + φ3 ) , D i, 6 = h σi, 5 (d i + λi, 2 + φ4 ) 
D i, 7 = h σi, 6 λi, 2 , D i, 8 = h α2 λi, 2 
as well as 
D 9 = h α3 (β1 + 
∑ m 
i =1 d i ) and D 10 = h α4 (β2 + 
∑ m 
i =1 d i ) . 
Thus, ˜ D = (id d , χd , D , C , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 ) where D = ({ D i , 1 , · · · , D i , 8 } m i = 1 , D 9 , D 10 ) . Here, D is the common encoded document vector 
for all the users in the system. 
ServPro ( ˜  D , ssk u , Q u ) : Perform the following steps: 
(1) Compute W 1 : 
W 1 = 
m ∏ 
i =1 
ˆ e(D i, 1 , Q i, 1 ) ˆ  e(D i, 4 , Q i, 4 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 2 , Q i, 2 ) ˆ  e(D i, 3 , Q i, 3 ) 
/ 
ˆ e(D 9 , Q 9 ) (1) 
(2) Compute W 2 : 
W 2 = 
m ∏ 
i =1 
ˆ e(D i, 5 , Q i, 5 ) ˆ  e(D i, 8 , Q i, 8 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 6 , Q i, 6 ) ˆ  e(D i, 7 , Q i, 7 ) 
/ 
ˆ e(D 10 , Q 10 ) (2) 
(3) Compute C 1 = ˆ e(C, 	u ) . 
Thus, R = (id d , χd , W 1 , W 2 , C, C 1 , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 ) . 
Remark 2. As Theorem 4.1 will show, component W 1 in R embeds secret values τ 1 , τ 2 and { μi , 1 } that the User keeps. 
Likewise, component W 2 embeds τ 3 , τ 4 and { μi , 3 }. Hence even if some d i is disclosed through a collusion between the 
Server and other users, the privacy of every q i value in the User ’s query Q u remains intact. 
Even with knowledge of { d i } and φ1 , φ3 through a colluding user, an adversary cannot temper with { q i } consistently in 
W 1 and W 2 because of secret values τ 1 and τ 3 . The adversary cannot temper with d i consistently in W 1 and W 2 without 
secret values τ 1 to τ 4 . Lastly, the adversary cannot temper with the result 
∑ m 
i =1 d i q i consistently in W 1 and W 2 without τ 1 
and τ 3 . 
UserDec (pk , uk , R , T q ) : Carry out the following steps: 
(1) Compute C 2 = ˆ e(C, u ) . 
(2) Compute φ j = H(id d ‖ j‖ C 1 ×C 2 ) = H(id d ‖ j‖ ˆ e(C, g θ )) for 1 ≤ j ≤4. 
(3) Validate χd on id d ‖ C ‖ φ1 ‖ ‖ φ4 ‖ E 1 ‖ E 2 ‖ E 3 using tpk . If it is invalid, output ⊥ and abort. 
(4) Compute R 1 = φ1 τ1 
∑ m 
i =1 q i + mφ1 τ2 + (φ1 − φ2 ) 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 1 mod p. 
(5) Compute W = W 1 × E τ2 2 /E 
R 1 
1 = E 
τ1 
∑ m 
i =1 d i q i 
1 . 
(6) Find v ∈ [0 , 2 k d + k q · m q ) such that (E τ1 1 ) v = W and m q is the number of coordinates used in q . 
(7) Compute R 2 = φ3 τ3 
∑ m 
i =1 q i + mφ3 τ4 + (φ3 − φ4 ) 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 3 mod p. 
(8) Verify that E 
τ3 v + R 2 
1 /E 
τ4 
3 
? = W 2 . If it holds, output v ; otherwise output ⊥ . 
Remark 3. With each coordinate in d and q having bit length k d and k q respectively, v is in the range [0 , 2 
k d + k q · m q ) where 
m q ≤m is the number of coordinates that the User speciﬁed in q . This range is expected to be much smaller than the size 
of the ciphertext space, p , making the recovery of v computationally feasible. We will show in Section 6 how to speed up 
the computation of v . If v has a high value, indicating a close match between d and q , the User may request for the actual 
document from the Owner ; otherwise, the User ignores the document. 
Remark 4. The veriﬁcation in Algorithm UserDec hinges on the following facts: 
• If there are colluding users, the Server may discover the values of d i and φ1 through φ4 . However, the Server still 
cannot deduce h σi, j (for 1 ≤ j ≤6) and h α j (for 1 ≤ j ≤4), which are needed in order to create encrypted vectors D for 
forged documents. 
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• The Server is unable to compose a fake document vector from multiple document vectors, because the one-way hash 
function H (.) prevents the Server from ﬁnding a corresponding C for the fake document vector. 
• The Server is unable to tamper with the query vector because it embeds the values τ1 , τ2 , τ3 , τ4 , 
∑ m 
i =1 q i , ∑ m 
i =1 μi, 1 , 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 3 that are retained by the User . 
• The Server has a negligible chance of tampering with the sum 
∑ m 
i =1 d i q i consistently in W 1 and W 2 , without the User ’s 
secret values τ 1 and τ 3 . 
• The position-speciﬁc secret values σ i , 1 , σ i , 2 , σ i , 3 , σ i , 4 , σ i , 5 , σ i , 6 in D and Q u ensure that, for any i ∈ [1, m ], D i , 1 must 
be paired with Q i , 1 , and D i , 5 with Q i , 5 , to produce d i q i . Pairing D i , 1 and D i , 5 with Q j , 1 and Q j , 5 , for any j  = i , will pro- 
duce random results that fail the user veriﬁcation. The values E 2 = ˆ e(h, g) β1 and E 3 = ˆ e(h, g) β2 provided by the Owner , 
together with the sums 
∑ m 
i =1 q i , 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 1 , 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 3 retained by the User , ensure that W 1 and W 2 are aggregated over 
all the coordinates i ∈ [1, m ]. 
Theorem 4.1. The above DSM scheme is correct. 
Proof. The correctness on χd is ensured by the signature scheme S . In the following, we only concern ourselves with the 
veriﬁability of the User ’s decoded result. 
For each 1 ≤ i ≤m , we have 
ˆ e(D i, 1 , Q i, 1 ) = ˆ e(h, g) (d i + λi, 1 + φ1 )(τ1 q i + τ2 ) ˆ  e(h, g) μi, 1 (d i + λi, 1 + φ1 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 2 , Q i, 2 ) = ˆ e(h, g) μi, 1 (d i + λi, 1 + φ2 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 3 , Q i, 3 ) = ˆ e(h, g) λi, 1 (τ1 q i + τ2 + μi, 2 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 4 , Q i, 4 ) = ˆ e(h, g) λi, 1 μi, 2 
ˆ e(D i, 5 , Q i, 5 ) = ˆ e(h, g) (d i + λi, 2 + φ3 )(τ3 q i + τ4 ) ˆ  e(h, g) μi, 3 (d i + λi, 2 + φ3 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 6 , Q i, 6 ) = ˆ e(h, g) μi, 3 (d i + λi, 2 + φ4 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 7 , Q i, 7 ) = ˆ e(h, g) λi, 2 (τ3 q i + τ4 + μi, 4 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 8 , Q i, 8 ) = ˆ e(h, g) λi, 2 μi, 4 
ˆ e(D 9 , Q 9 ) = ˆ e(h, g) τ2 β1 + τ2 
∑ m 
i =1 d i 
ˆ e(D 10 , Q 10 ) = ˆ e(h, g) τ4 β2 + τ4 
∑ m 
i =4 d i 
Thus, according to the equalities (1) and (2) , we have 
W 1 = 
m ∏ 
i =1 
ˆ e(h, g) (d i + φ1 )(τ1 q i + τ2 )+(φ1 −φ2 ) μi, 1 
/ 
ˆ e(h, g) τ2 β1 + τ2 
∑ m 
i =1 d i 
= ˆ e(h, g) τ1 
∑ m 
i =1 d i q i ˆ  e(h, g) φ1 τ1 
∑ m 
i =1 q i + mφ1 τ2 +(φ1 −φ2 ) 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 1 
/ 
ˆ e(h, g) τ2 β1 
and 
W 2 = 
m ∏ 
i =1 
ˆ e(h, g) (d i + φ3 )(τ3 q i + τ4 )+(φ3 −φ4 ) μi, 3 
/ 
ˆ e(h, g) τ4 β2 + τ4 
∑ m 
i =4 d i 
= ˆ e(h, g) τ3 
∑ m 
i =1 d i q i ˆ  e(h, g) φ3 τ3 
∑ m 
i =1 q i + mφ3 τ4 +(φ3 −φ4 ) 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 3 
/ 
ˆ e(h, g) τ4 β2 
Deﬁning 
R 1 = φ1 τ1 
m ∑ 
i =1 
q i + mφ1 τ2 + (φ1 − φ2 ) 
m ∑ 
i =1 
μi, 1 mod p, 
we have 
W = W 1 × E τ2 2 /E R 1 1 
= ˆ e(h, g) 
τ1 
∑ m 
i =1 d i q i × ˆ e(h, g) R 1 × ˆ e(h, g) β1 τ2 
ˆ e(h, g) τ2 β1 × ˆ e(h, g) R 1 
= ˆ e(h, g) τ1 
∑ m 
i =1 d i q i 
= E τ1 
∑ m 
i =1 d i q i 
1 
There must exist a unique v ∈ [0 , 2 k d + k q · m q ) such that (E τ1 1 ) v = W, which means v = 
∑ m 
i =1 d i q i mod p. Furthermore, for 
a valid v and letting 
R 2 = φ3 τ3 
m ∑ 
i =1 
q i + mφ3 τ4 + (φ3 − φ4 ) 
m ∑ 
i =1 
μi, 3 mod p, 
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we must have 
E τ3 v + R 2 
1 /E 
τ4 
3 = ˆ e(h, g) τ3 v + R 2 / ˆ  e(h, g) β2 τ4 
= ˆ e(h, g) τ3 
∑ m 
i =1 d i q i ˆ  e(h, g) φ3 τ3 
∑ m 
i =1 q i + mφ3 τ4 +(φ3 −φ4 ) 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 3 
/ 
ˆ e(h, g) τ4 β2 
= W 2 
The correctness of the DSM scheme follows. 
4.2. Security analysis 
We analyze the security of our construction in Section 4.1 , showing in turn how it satisﬁes the various security require- 
ments deﬁned in Section 3.2 . 
Theorem 4.2. The proposed DSM scheme guarantees the integrity of user queries against the Server and colluding users; that 
is, even when the Server colludes with a set U of users, it cannot modify the standing queries of honest users and still generate 
valid encoded results for documents. 
Proof. We show that if signature scheme S is existentially unforgeable and the discrete logarithm problem is hard, then 
there exists no PPT adversary controlling the Server and user set U , who can break the integrity of user queries in the 
DSM scheme with non-negligible probability. 
Setup : Following the proposed scheme, challenger C runs (pk, sk ) ← Setup (1  , m ) , and (uk i , ssk i ) ← UserReg (pk, sk ) for 
each user in U . C then gives pk and { ssk i } U to adversary A . 
Queries : As deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3.2 , adversary A adaptively issues the following three types of queries. Challenger C
maintains the corresponding query lists that record all the queries and responses. 
• Query generation queries : For each query q l , i = { q l , i , j } m j = 1 of user U l ∈ U where q l,i, j ∈ [0 , 2 k q ) ⊂ Z p , the challenger follows 
algorithm QueryGen (pk, uk l , q l , i ) to produce Q l, i and returns Q l, i to A . Here, if U l has not posed this type of queries 
before, the challenger runs UserReg (pk, sk ) to generate a user key uk l and a server-side key ssk l , then gives ssk l to the 
adversary along with Q l, i . 
• Document generation queries : For each query d j = { d j , t } m t = 1 where d j,t ∈ [0 , 2 k d ) ⊂ Z p , the challenger follows algorithm 
DocGen (pk , sk , d j ) to produce ˜ D j and returns ˜ D j to A . 
• Decoding queries : For each encoded query result R l,i, j for a queried standing query q l, i of user U l ∈ U and a queried 
document d j , the challenger runs UserDec (pk, uk l , R l,i, j , T q l , i ) and sends back the corresponding result v or ⊥ . 
Output : Eventually, the adversary outputs an index pair ( ˆ i , ˆ  l ) that corresponds to some q ˆ l , ˆ i of user U ˆ l ∈ U in the query 
list. C then challenges the adversary with ˜ D = (id d , χd , D , C , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 ) ← DocGen (pk , sk , d ) where d is a randomly chosen 
fresh document. Suppose the adversary responds with R ′ = (id d , χd , W ′ 1 , W ′ 2 , C, C ′ 1 , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 ) and wins the game. There are 
two cases to consider: 
Case 1: C ′ 1  = C 1 where C 1 is generated with information that C maintains locally. 
In this case, the signature χd ˆ i 
must be valid for a string of parameters id d ‖ C‖ φ′ 1 ‖ · · · ‖ φ′ 4 ‖ E 1 ‖ E 2 ‖ E 3 , where φ′ j = 
H(id d ‖ j‖ C ′ 1 × ˆ e(C, u )) for 1 ≤ j ≤4. It implies the adversary has generated a forged signature for a new message, and in 
doing so breaks the signature scheme S . 
Case 2: C ′ 
1 = C 1 . 
In this case, algorithm UserDec (pk, uk ˆ l , R 
′ 
, T q ˆ l , ˆ i 
) outputs v ′ such that the following equalities hold: 
E τ1 v 
′ + R 1 
1 = W ′ 1 × E τ2 2 , E τ3 v 
′ + R 2 
1 = W ′ 2 × E τ4 3 
Furthermore, according to the information maintained by the challenger, the following equalities hold for v ← 
UserDec (pk, uk ˆ l , R , T q ˆ l , ˆ i 
) : 
E τ1 v + R 1 
1 = W 1 × E τ2 2 , E τ3 v + R 2 1 = W 2 × E τ4 3 
Clearly, v ′  = v otherwise both W ′ 
1 = W 1 and W ′ 2 = W 2 would hold, which in turn implies R ′ = R . Denoting v = v − v ′ 
mod p, 
E τ1 v 
1 = W 1 /W ′ 1 , E τ3 v 1 = W 2 /W ′ 2 
which yields (
W 1 
W ′ 
1 
)τ3 
= 
(
W 2 
W ′ 
2 
)τ1 
(3) 
Note that W 1 and W 2 are independent, since the underlying D i, j and Q i, j rely on uniformly distributed elements λi, j , μi, j 
and τ j , etc. Thus, the adversary needs to know the value of τ 1 and τ 3 in order to output a “valid” pair of W 
′ 
1 and W 
′ 
2 
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with non-negligible probability that satisfy Equality (3) . However, this contradicts the assumption that discrete logarithm is 
hard. 
Theorem 4.3. The proposed DSM scheme guarantees the privacy of user queries against the Server and a set U of colluding 
users; that is, they can neither distinguish between the standing queries outsourced by a honest User , nor obtain the content of 
the queries. 
Proof. In the composition of Q u , ({ Q i, 1 , D i, 2 , D i, 3 , Q i, 4 } m i =1 , Q 9 ) and ({ Q i, 5 , D i, 6 , D i, 7 , Q i, 8 } m i =1 , Q 10 ) are independent as they in- 
volve different sets of τ and μ values. In fact, the elements in Q u look random to the Server if the elements in both Z ∗p 
and G are uniformly distributed. Speciﬁcally, in encoding q i ∈ q , Q i , 2 and Q i , 4 are determined by random elements μi , 1 
and μi , 2 respectively, while Q i , 1 and Q i , 3 depend on τ 1 , τ 2 , μi , 1 , μi , 2 . Similarly, Q i , 6 and Q i , 8 are determined by random 
elements μi , 3 and μi , 4 respectively, while Q i , 5 and Q i , 7 depend on τ 3 , τ 4 , μi , 3 , μi , 4 . In addition, Q 9 and Q 10 rely on τ 2 
and τ 4 respectively. The bases of Q i, j , Q 9 and Q 10 are in the User ’s secret key, i.e., g 
1 /σi, j and g 1 /α j , which are shared by all 
users who have registered with the Owner . In this collusion scenario, these bases are thus known to the adversary. That, 
however, does not compromise the privacy of the encoded queries since all the randomness are realized in the exponents. 
Since all the values of τ j and μi, j are randomly chosen from Z 
∗
p , the elements in Q u are random elements of group G from 
the Server ’s perspective. 
Furthermore, suppose two queries q 1 and q 2 contain the same value at some coordinate, for example, q 1 , j = q 2 , j = q . In 
our construction, the encoding of q in different queries uses different sets of random values τ and μ. Thus, the colluding 
Server and user set U cannot distinguish between encoded queries that contain the same coordinate values. Since all ele- 
ments q i in a query q are raised to elements of G , the colluding Server and user set U cannot recover q i as long as the 
discrete logarithm assumption holds. 
Theorem 4.4. The proposed DSM scheme guarantees the integrity of documents against the Server and colluding users; that is, 
even when the Server colludes with a set U of users, it cannot modify the processed documents and still generate valid encoded 
results for standing queries. 
Proof. We show that if the signature scheme S is existentially unforgeable and the discrete logarithm problem is hard, then 
there exists no PPT adversary controlling the Server and user set U , who can break the integrity of processed documents in 
the DSM scheme with non-negligible probability. 
Setup : The same as in the proof of Theorem 4.2 . 
Queries : The same as in the proof of Theorem 4.2 . 
Output : Eventually, the adversary outputs a tuple ( R ′ , id d ˆ i , 
ˆ j , ˆ  l ) and wins the game, where R ′ = 
(id d ˆ i 
, χ ′ 
d ˆ i 
, W ′ 
1 , W 
′ 
2 , C 
′ , C ′ 
1 , E 
′ 
1 , E 
′ 
2 , E 
′ 
3 ) . With the locally maintained information, the challenger gets 
˜ D ˆ i = (id d ˆ i , χd ˆ i , D ˆ i , C , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 ) ← DocGen (pk , sk , d ˆ i ) , 
and 
R = (id d ˆ i , χd ˆ i , W 1 , W 2 , C, C 1 , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 ) ← ServPro ( ˜  D ˆ i , ssk ˆ l , Q ˆ l , ˆ j ) . 
There are two cases to consider: 
Case 1: (χ ′ 
d ˆ i 
, C ′ , E ′ 
1 , E 
′ 
2 , E 
′ 
3 )  = (χd ˆ i , C, E 1 , E 2 , E 3 ) . 
In this case, the signature χ ′ 
d ˆ i 
must be valid for a string of parameters id ′ 
d ˆ i 
‖ C ′ ‖ φ′ 1 ‖ · · · ‖ φ′ 4 ‖ E ′ 1 ‖ E ′ 2 ‖ E ′ 3 , where φ′ j = 
H(id ′ 
d ˆ i 
‖ j‖ C ′ 
1 × ˆ e(C ′ , u )) for 1 ≤ j ≤4. It implies the adversary has generated a forged signature for a new message and, 
in doing so, breaks the signature scheme S . 
Case 2: (χ ′ 
d ˆ i 
, C ′ , E ′ 
1 , E 
′ 
2 , E 
′ 
3 ) = (χd ˆ i , C, E 1 , E 2 , E 3 ) . 
Here, the discussion is similar to Case 2 in the proof of Theorem 4.2 . 
Theorem 4.5. The proposed DSM scheme guarantees the privacy of documents against a malicious Server ; that is, the Server 
can neither distinguish between the processed documents, nor obtain their contents. 
Proof. In the composition of ˜ D , ({ D i, 1 , D i, 2 , D i, 3 , D i, 4 } m i =1 , D 9 ) and ({ D i, 5 , D i, 6 , D i, 7 , D i, 8 } m i =1 , D 10 ) are independent as they in- 
volve different λ and β values. In fact, the elements in ˜ D look random to the Server if the elements in both Z ∗p , G and 
G T are uniformly distributed. Speciﬁcally, in processing d i ∈ d , the elements C, E 1 , E 2 , E 3 in ˜ D essentially rely on the random 
values r, β1 , β2 , h . As H is a collision-resistant hash function, φi are pseudo-random values over Z 
∗
p . Hence, D i , 1 , , D i , 4 
are determined by the random elements h, λi , 1 , φ1 , φ2 . Similarly, D i , 5 , , D i , 8 are determined by the random elements 
h, λi , 2 , φ3 , φ4 . In addition, D 9 and D 10 rely on β1 and β2 respectively. Notice that the exponents of D i, j , D 9 and D 10 are 
further randomized by the Owner ’s secret key, i.e., σ i, j and αj . Since all the β j and λi, j values are randomly chosen from 
Z ∗p , the elements in Q u are random elements of group G and group G T from the Server ’s view. 
Furthermore, suppose two documents d 1 and d 2 contain the same value at some coordinate, for example, d 1 , j = d 2 , j = d . 
In our construction, the encoding of d in different documents uses different sets of random values λ, φ, β and h . Thus, 
the Server cannot distinguish between processed documents that contain the same coordinate values. Since all elements 
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d i in a document d are raised to elements of G , the Server cannot recover their values as long as the discrete logarithm 
assumption holds. 
Remark 5. Our DSM scheme is proposed under the assumption that the Server would always respond to all qualiﬁed User s 
when a fresh document is published (see Section 2.1 ). In some situation, the Server may refuse to provide service, that is, 
the Server will not match some queries with some documents. This issue can be easily addressed by adding an auditing 
phase to the DSM system. That is, at run time, the Owner will record all the identiﬁers of the published documents and 
each User will also record all the document identiﬁers included in the received monitored results R . Then, the User can 
periodically report to the Owner a list of document identiﬁers that were matched with her queries. This way, the Owner 
can compare the received identiﬁers with the locally maintained ones for auditing. 
5. Query privacy against the owner 
Our scheme in Section 4 achieves query privacy against the Server and colluding users, but not the Owner . This level 
of protection is usually adequate, as a User has to trust the Owner implicitly to utilize the documents served out by the 
latter. Nevertheless, there may still be situations where users desire query privacy against even the Owner . We show how 
that can be achieved in this section. 
We begin by explaining why our original scheme does not protect query privacy against the Owner . With secret key sk , 
the Owner could compute Q 
σi, 1 
i, 1 / (Q 
σi, 2 
i, 2 × Q 
α3 
9 ) = g τ1 q i , for example. This allows the Owner to deduce whether q i = 0 , and 
whether two coordinates q i and q j in a query vector have the same value. 
To achieve query privacy against the Owner , the changes that we need to make to the scheme in Section 4 are summa- 
rized below. 
Setup (1  , m ) : In addition to the existing steps, select α5 , α6 ∈ R Z p and include them in secret key sk . 
UserReg (pk, sk ) : In the output to the User , change { g 1 /α j } 4 
j=1 to { g 1 /α j } 6 j=1 . 
QueryGen (pk , uk , q ) : Changes to Algorithm QueryGen are: 
(1) Select τ1 , τi, 2 , τ3 , τi, 4 , τ5 , τ6 ∈ R Z p for 1 ≤ i ≤m . 
(2) Compute Q u = { Q i , 1 , Q i , 2 , · · · , Q i , 10 } m i = 1 where: 
Q i, 1 = g (τ1 q i + τi, 2 + μi, 1 ) /σi, 1 , Q i, 2 = g μi, 1 /σi, 2 
Q i, 3 = g (τ1 q i + τi, 2 + μi, 2 ) /σi, 3 , Q i, 4 = g μi, 2 /α1 
Q i, 5 = g (τ3 q i + τi, 4 + μi, 3 ) /σi, 4 , Q i, 6 = g μi, 3 /σi, 5 
Q i, 7 = g (τ3 q i + τi, 4 + μi, 4 ) /σi, 6 , Q i, 8 = g μi, 4 /α2 
Q i, 9 = g τi, 2 τ5 /α3 , Q i, 10 = g τi, 4 τ6 /α4 
(3) Send Q u to the Server , retain T q which includes τ 1 , τ 3 , { τi, 2 , τi, 4 } m i =1 , τ 5 , τ 6 , 
∑ m 
i =1 q i , 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 1 and 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 3 . 
DocGen (pk , sk , d ) : Changes to Algorithm DocGen are: 
(1) Compute E 1 = ˆ e(h, g) . 
(2) Compute χd = S. Sign tsk (id d ‖ C‖ φ1 ‖ · · · ‖ φ4 ‖ E 1 ) . 
(3) Select λi, j ∈ R Z p for 1 ≤ i ≤m and 1 ≤ j ≤4. 
(4) Compute D = { D i , 1 , D i , 2 , · · · , D i , 12 } m i = 1 where: 
D i, 9 = h α3 (d i + λi, 3 ) , D i, 10 = h α4 (d i + λi, 4 ) 
D i, 11 = h α5 λi, 3 , D i, 12 = h α6 λi, 4 
(5) Send ˜ D = (id d , χd , D , C , E 1 ) to the Server . 
ServPro ( ˜  D , ssk u , Q u ) : Replace the steps in Algorithm ServPro with the following: 
(1) Compute w i , 1 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤m : 
ˆ e(D i, 1 , Q i, 1 ) = ˆ e(h, g) (d i + λi, 1 + φ1 )(τ1 q i + τi, 2 ) ˆ  e(h, g) μi, 1 (d i + λi, 1 + φ1 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 2 , Q i, 2 ) = ˆ e(h, g) μi, 1 (d i + λi, 1 + φ2 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 3 , Q i, 3 ) = ˆ e(h, g) λi, 1 (τ1 q i + τi, 2 + μi, 2 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 4 , Q i, 4 ) = ˆ e(h, g) λi, 1 μi, 2 
ˆ e(D i, 9 , Q i, 9 ) = ˆ e(h, g) τi, 2 τ5 (d i + λi, 3 ) 
w i, 1 = 
ˆ e(D i, 1 , Q i, 1 ) ˆ  e(D i, 4 , Q i, 4 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 2 , Q i, 2 ) ˆ  e(D i, 3 , Q i, 3 ) 
= ˆ e(h, g) (d i + φ1 )(τ1 q i + τi, 2 )+(φ1 −φ2 ) μi, 1 
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(2) Compute 
W 1 = 
m ∏ 
i =1 
w i, 1 = ˆ e(h, g) 
∑ m 
i =1 (d i + φ1 )(τ1 q i + τi, 2 )+(φ1 −φ2 ) 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 1 
	1 = 
m ∏ 
i =1 
ˆ e(D i, 9 , Q i, 9 ) = ˆ e(h, g) τ5 
∑ m 
i =1 τi, 2 (d i + λi, 3 ) 
(3) Compute w i , 2 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤m : 
ˆ e(D i, 5 , Q i, 5 ) = ˆ e(h, g) (d i + λi, 2 + φ3 )(τ3 q i + τi, 4 ) ˆ  e(h, g) μi, 3 (d i + λi, 2 + φ3 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 6 , Q i, 6 ) = ˆ e(h, g) μi, 3 (d i + λi, 2 + φ4 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 7 , Q i, 7 ) = ˆ e(h, g) λi, 2 (τ3 q i + τi, 4 + μi, 4 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 8 , Q i, 8 ) = ˆ e(h, g) λi, 2 μi, 4 
ˆ e(D i, 10 , Q i, 10 ) = ˆ e(h, g) τi, 4 τ6 (d i + λi, 4 ) 
w i, 2 = 
ˆ e(D i, 5 , Q i, 5 ) ˆ  e(D i, 8 , Q i, 8 ) 
ˆ e(D i, 6 , Q i, 6 ) ˆ  e(D i, 7 , Q i, 7 ) 
= ˆ e(h, g) (d i + φ3 )(τ3 q i + τi, 4 )+(φ3 −φ4 ) μi, 3 
(4) Compute 
W 2 = 
m ∏ 
i =1 
w i, 2 = ˆ e(h, g) 
∑ m 
i =1 (d i + φ3 )(τ3 q i + τi, 4 )+(φ3 −φ4 ) 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 3 
	2 = 
m ∏ 
i =1 
ˆ e(D i, 10 , Q i, 10 ) = ˆ e(h, g) τ6 
∑ m 
i =1 τi, 4 (d i + λi, 4 ) 
(5) Compute C 1 = ˆ e(C, 	u ) . 
(6) Send R = (id d , χd , W 1 , W 2 , C, C 1 , E 1 , 	1 , 	2 , { D i, 11 , D i, 12 } m i =1 ) to the User . 
UserDec (pk , uk , R , T q ) : Replace the steps in Algorithm UserDec with the following: 
(1) Validate χd on id d ‖ C ‖ φ1 ‖ ‖ φ4 ‖ E 1 using tpk . If it is invalid, output ⊥ and abort. 
(2) Compute R 1 = φ1 τ1 
∑ m 
i =1 q i + φ1 
∑ m 
i =1 τi, 2 + (φ1 − φ2 ) 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 1 . 
(3) Compute R 2 = 	1 /τ5 1 / 
∏ m 
i =1 ˆ  e(D i, 11 , g 
τi, 2 /α5 ) = E 
∑ m 
i =1 d i τi, 2 
1 . 
(4) Compute W = W 1 / (E R 1 1 × R 2 ) = E 
τ1 
∑ m 
i =1 d i q i 
1 . 
(5) Find v ∈ [0 , 2 k d + k q · m q ) such that 
[
E 
τ1 
1 
]v = W and m q is the number of coordinates used in q . 
(6) Compute R 3 = φ3 τ3 
∑ m 
i =1 q i + φ3 
∑ m 
i =1 τi, 4 + (φ3 − φ4 ) 
∑ m 
i =1 μi, 3 . 
(7) Compute R 4 = 	1 /τ6 2 / 
∏ m 
i =1 ˆ  e(D i, 12 , g 
τi, 4 /α6 ) = E 
∑ m 
i =1 d i τi, 4 
1 . 
(8) Verify that E 
τ3 v + R 3 
1 × R 4 
? = W 2 . If the condition holds, then output v , otherwise output ⊥ . 
With the modiﬁed scheme in this section, the communication cost between the Server and users, as well as the user 
decoding cost, become linear in | d | (the length of a document vector). These are on the same order as the corresponding 
costs incurred by the näive method of having the Owner distribute his document vectors directly to the users, which also 
affords query privacy, result privacy and veriﬁability. The advantage of our modiﬁed scheme is it adds document privacy to 
query privacy, result privacy and veriﬁability. With the scheme, a User can only defeat document privacy with the help of 
a colluding Server ; for example, a Server that allows | d | probing queries from the User to discover all the coordinates in 
a document vector. 
6. Optimizations for query result decoding 
In Algorithm UserDec in Section 4.1 , the User needs to extract the inner product v = q · d ∈ [ 0 , 2 k d + k q ·m q ) such that 
(E 
τ1 
1 ) 
v = W . We now discuss techniques to optimize the extraction of v . We will validate the practicality of the optimized 
algorithm through experiments in Section 7.2 . 
6.1. Constraining the range of the query result 
To constrain the search for v , the User may predeﬁne a threshold t to ﬁlter out documents with low scores, signifying 
that they are too dissimilar to the User ’s interest and may be discarded without examination. This limits the search for v 
to a narrower range [ t, 2 k d + k q · m q ) . Here t is chosen by and known only to the User . 
Moreover, when the document streaming rate is high, the User may wish to monitor only the top- k documents 
[8] within a sliding window (of some number of recent documents, or of documents that arrived within the last several 
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Table 3 
Theoretical performance comparison. 
Scheme in [5] Section 4.1 Section 5 
Element size Encoded query mξG ′ (8 m + 2) ξG 10 m ξG 
Processed document (m + 1) ξG ′ ξs + ξZ + (8 m + 3) ξG + 3 ξT ξs + ξZ + (12 m + 1) ξG + 1 ξT 
Computation cost UserReg 2 δG ′ + δT ′ (6 m + 6) δG (6 m + 8) δG 
QueryGen 2 mδG ′ (8 m + 2) δG 10 m δG 
DocGen 2 mδG ′ + δ ˆ e′ (8 m + 4) δG + 2 δT + 2 δ ˆ e + δS 12 mδG + δ ˆ e + δS 
ServPro (m + 1) δ ˆ e′ (8 m + 3) δ ˆ e (10 m + 1) δ ˆ e
UserDec δ ˆ e′ + δT ′ + δ δ ˆ e + 4 δT + δV + δ (2 m + 2) δG + 2 δT + 2 mδ ˆ e + δV + δ 
seconds). The score v k of the k th ranked document provides another lower bound to limit the search for v . Therefore, the 
User only needs to search for the score v of the new document within a bounded range: 
v ∈ [ max { t, v k } , 2 k d + k q · m q ) (4) 
The constraints in the formula enable the User to avoid a full discrete logarithm computation in Z p for v , by exploiting 
secret application-speciﬁc values t, v k and m q which only the User knows. 
In our target applications, typically the number of features that User s specify in queries satisﬁes m q m and is within a 
hundred or two. Moreover, k d and k q are also small. Thus, if the constrained range for v is narrow, the User can pre-generate 
a look-up table for v . If not, the User has to perform a “bounded” discrete logarithm computation for v as explained next. 
6.2. Bounded baby-step giant-step method 
There exist several algorithms for solving the discrete logarithm problem, such as the baby-step giant-step algorithm, the 
Pohlig–Hellman algorithm and the index-calculus algorithm [12] . Although the latter two are superior in asymptotic time 
complexity, they are diﬃcult to optimize to take advantage of the constraints expressed in Formula 4 . Instead, we pick the 
baby-step giant-step algorithm for the User ’s discrete logarithm computation. The optimization works as follows to ﬁnd 
v ∈ [ max (t, v k ) , 2 k d + k q · m q ) satisfying (E τ1 1 ) v = W in the UserDec algorithm. 
Let b = E τ1 
1 , γ = 
⌈ √ 
2 k d + k q · m q 
⌉ 
and v = c 1 · γ + c 0 for some 0 ≤ c 0 , c 1 < γ . Thus, b −c 1 γW = b c 0 . The User creates be- 
forehand a lookup table for 〈 b c 0 , c 0 〉 with b c 0 as search key, for 0 ≤ c 0 < γ . For each v , the User iteratively checks whether 
b −c 1 γW exists in the lookup table, decrementing c 1 from γ − 1 down towards  max ( t, v k )/ γ  . The procedure may be sus- 
pended after any iteration; as long as c 1 is kept, the procedure can be resumed subsequently. 
Suppose that the User has a set of top- k documents in place when he obtains the answer W for a new document d . He 
needs to evaluate immediately whether its score v falls within [ max (t, v k ) , 2 k d + k q · m q ) . If so, d replaces one of the earlier 
documents in the top- k result. If not, the User has established an upper bound v = v k for v . The User also knows the 
earliest that d may be considered for the top- k result again is when one of the current top- k documents expires and v k 
changes. 
Now suppose that in between document arrivals, the User has several documents d i with upper bound score v i = v k . 
Instead of recovering the actual score v i for each of those documents in turn, the User lowers their upper bounds v i ’s 
uniformly (by decrementing c 1 in the computation of their document scores in unison). This allows the User to fully decode 
the higher result scores ﬁrst, and discover the more relevant candidates that are likely to replace the next expiring document 
in the top- k result. 
7. Performance analysis 
7.1. Theoretical analysis 
We analyze the eﬃciency of our DSM construction in Section 4.1 and its extension in Section 5 , and compare them in 
Table 3 with the existing scheme in [5] in terms of the sizes of encoded queries and documents, and computation costs 
of each procedure. The analyses focus on resource-intensive computations including exponentiation and bilinear mapping, 
while lightweight computations such as addition, multiplication and hash evaluation are omitted. The costs of encoding one 
query q and one document d with dimensionality m , and of processing (at the server side) and decoding one score q ·d are 
considered for the procedures QueryGen , DocGen , ServPro and UserDec , respectively. 
In Table 3 , for a bilinear map ˆ e : G ×G → G T where G and G T have prime order p , we use ξG , ξ T and ξ Z to represent the 
element size in G , G T and Z p , and δG and δT to denote the costs of evaluating an exponentiation in G and G T , respectively. 
We also use δ ˆ e to denote the evaluation cost of such a bilinear mapping ˆ e(·, ·) . Similarly, for a bilinear map ˆ e : G ×G → G T 
where G and G T have composite order n = p 1 p 2 and p 1 , p 2 are distinct prime numbers, we use ξG ′ and ξT ′ to represent the 
element size in G and G T , and δG ′ and δT ′ to denote the costs of evaluating an exponentiation in G and G T , respectively. 
We also use δ ˆ e′ to denote the evaluation cost of such a bilinear mapping ˆ e(·, ·) for composite order bilinear group. For the 
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Table 4 
Experiment parameters. 
Symbol Meaning Setting 
λ Document arrival rate per minute 1–10 –30 
w Sliding window of documents for query results (minute) 60 
k Top- k documents for query results 10 –60 
signature scheme S = (KeyGen , Sign , Verify) , δS and δV respectively represent the computation costs of running S. Sign and 
S. Verify , whereas ξ s denotes its signature size. We let δ denote the cost of ﬁnding v in the UserDec procedure. 
From Table 3 , we see that the scheme in [5] relies on bilinear groups with composite order which is less eﬃcient than 
bilinear groups with prime order that our schemes are based on. In all the schemes, the sizes of encoded queries and pro- 
cessed documents are linear with the dimensionality m . The computation costs of the user registration algorithm UserReg 
and user decoding algorithm UserDec in [5] are independent of the dimensionality m , whereas only UserDec in our basic 
DSM construction in Section 4.1 enjoys this property. All the other algorithms need to perform computations that are linear 
with m . Although our extended scheme in Section 5 is not as eﬃcient as the basic one in Section 4.1 , it provides more 
stringent privacy guarantee for user queries. 
7.2. Experiments 
In this section, we evaluate the overall practicality of our DSM scheme, and the effectiveness of the optimization tech- 
niques introduced in Section 6 in particular. While we include the existing CVPM scheme from [5] as baseline in our 
evaluation, we emphasize that the DSM scheme in this paper provides strictly stronger security protection. 
7.2.1. Experiment set-up 
We begin by describing the set-up of the experiments. In Table 4 which summarizes the experiment parameters, the 
default setting of each parameter is highlighted in bold font. 
Datasets: To ensure that our observations are generalizable, we have run DSM on several datasets. Here we report 
on two real datasets from the UCI KDD Archive. 2 These datasets are picked because they vary from each other in key 
properties that stress the various algorithms in DSM . The ﬁrst, Corel Image, contains feature vectors extracted from 68040 
photo images. Each feature vector is a point in 32-dimensional HSV color space, so m = 32 . We discretize every dimension 
into 2 8 integer values. The feature vectors contain many zero coordinates, and the correlation between feature vectors are 
generally low. The dataset relates closely to the surveillance application in Section 1 that we used to motivate our problem 
formulation. 
The second dataset, US Census, is a discretized version of part of the data collected in the 1990 U.S. census. The dataset 
includes 2,458,285 records (vectors), each with m = 68 attribute values. The attribute domains vary in size, with the widest 
being [0, 20]. The correlation between vectors are high, relative to that in the Corel Image data. The data in this collection 
are essentially user proﬁles, hence they simulate the user proﬁle matching application described in the Introduction. 
Methodology: For both datasets, we extract 100 vectors randomly to be user queries. The rest of the vectors are shuﬄed 
and fed into the document stream from the Owner . The arrival rate is λ documents/minute. The User maintains a sliding 
window of the documents that arrived in the last w minutes, and the k documents with highest correlation scores in this 
window constitute the result of a query. For each experiment setting, the performance measures are averaged over the 100 
queries. 
Competing schemes: We compare the DSM scheme proposed in this paper with the CVPM scheme from [5] . Both 
schemes are implemented in C language, on the PBC cryptography library from Stanford University. 3 For DSM , we set the 
group order p to a 160-bit prime number, which provides 80 bits of security and is equivalent in strength to 1024-bit RSA 
keys [3] . In the case of CVPM , the group order is set to the product of two 512-bit prime numbers to give the same level 
of security. The experiments are run on a MacBook Pro with 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7 CPU and 8GB of main memory. 
Metrics: Our performance metrics include: (a) average time taken by the Owner to register a User with the UserReg 
algorithm; (b) average time taken by the User to generate a query with the QueryGen algorithm; (c) average time taken by 
the Owner in executing the DocGen algorithm on a new document; (d) average time taken by the Server to execute the 
ServPro algorithm for each document-query pair; and (e) average time taken by the User to run the UserDec algorithm 
and update her top- k result upon a document arrival, with and without the optimization described in Section 6 . Among the 
metrics, the execution time of the DocGen , ServPro and UserDec algorithms affect runtime responsiveness and are our 
primary concerns. 
2 http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/ . 
3 http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/ . 
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Fig. 3. User decoding time for Corel Image data. 
Table 5 
Processing times (ms) for Corel Image data. 
UserReg QueryGen DocGen ServPro 
CVPM 12.87 206.24 220.66 275.56 
DSM 0.10 46.08 17.25 36.99 
Table 6 
Processing times (ms) for US Census data. 
UserReg QueryGen DocGen ServPro 
CVPM 12.87 438.26 452.28 576.19 
DSM 0.10 97.93 36.32 78.28 
7.2.2. Corel image experiment 
For the Corel Image data, we set the sliding window w to 60 min and vary λ from 1 to 30 documents/minute. Referring 
to Formula 4 , the threshold t is set to 0, so pruning of the search space for the correlation score v of a new document relies 
solely on v k , the correlation score of the k -th result document. 
Fig. 3 plots the average execution time of the UserDec algorithm, for k = 10 , 20 , 40 and 60. The ﬁgure also gives the 
execution time of ‘No Opt’, which disables the optimization techniques in Section 6 . Here, the time taken by DSM is consis- 
tently just over 20% that of CVPM . The main cause of this performance difference is that DSM operates on a bilinear group 
with prime order, whereas CVPM requires a much larger bilinear group with composite order. 
Another observation is that with a larger k, v k becomes lower. If the correlation score v of an arriving document is below 
v k , the User will have to execute more iterations in the baby-step giant-step algorithm before she can conclude that the 
new document scores below v k and hence is not (yet) eligible for the top- k result. This explains why a larger k lengthens 
the execution time. 
For a ﬁxed k setting, the execution time drops as λ increases. The reason is that the sliding window accumulates more 
documents, in the process pushing up the k th highest correlation score and narrowing the search space for v . 
In the worst case, the User executes the baby-step giant-step algorithm until v is discovered, so the execution time is 
bounded from above by the ‘No Opt’ method. The results demonstrate that the optimization techniques in Section 6 have 
the potential to cut user decoding time signiﬁcantly. 
Table 5 summarizes the other performance metrics. Again, we observe that DSM executes much faster than CVPM due 
to the difference between their group orders. For DocGen and ServPro , the two algorithms beside UserDec that affect 
runtime responsiveness, DSM ’s execution time is merely 7.8% and 13.4% of CVPM ’s, respectively. 
7.2.3. US Census experiment 
Turning to the US Census data, we again set the sliding window w at 60 min. The document arrival rate λ varies from 1 
to 10 documents/minute. 
The average user decoding time is summarized in Fig. 4 . Here the performance effects of k and λ, and hence of the 
optimization techniques in Section 6 , are not noticeable. This is because the narrower feature domains (i.e., smaller k d and 
k q values in Formula 4 ) constrain the search space for the correlation score v of arriving documents. Even so, DSM remains 
consistently three times faster than CVPM . 
The execution time of the other algorithms are reported in Table 6 . With the exception of set-up time, the execution 
times here are higher than in the previous experiment, on account of the larger number of features in this dataset – m = 68 
– compared to m = 32 in the Corel Image data. Between the two schemes, DSM continues to achieve performance gains 
over CVPM that are similar to those seen in the previous experiment. 
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Fig. 4. User decoding time for US Census data. 
7.2.4. Summary of experiment results 
Besides Corel Image and US Census data, we experimented with several other datasets like the Insurance Company 
Benchmark, also available from the UCI KDD Archive. The common observations across experiments are as follows: 
• The User decoding cost is sensitive to the number of features and their domain size. For applications that utilize many 
features with large domain sizes, it may be necessary to bucketize the feature values; effectively, this induces a coarser 
resolution on the features. 
• The optimization techniques described in Section 6 are particularly effective with high document rate λ, large sliding 
window w or low k settings, as they tend to raise the correlation score v k of the k th result document. 
• Where the feature vectors have high dimensionality, it may be necessary to parallelize the DocGen and ServPro al- 
gorithms executed at the Owner and Server . This is straightforward to implement, as the computation on different 
coordinates in a document vector can be carried out independently. 
• Our DSM scheme delivers acceptable performance for many practical application settings, with sub-second execution 
time for every party in the data streaming model. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we formalize the framework of server-aided data stream monitoring ( DSM ) system and formulate the 
corresponding security requirements. In DSM , an untrusted server functions as intermediary for computing the correlation 
scores between documents streamed from the data owner, and standing queries issued by users. The correlation compu- 
tation translates to an inner product of the document and query vectors concerned. We present a DSM construction that 
concurrently safeguards the integrity and privacy of the documents and queries, while enabling users to verify the correct- 
ness of the correlation scores received. We prove that the scheme offers strong security protection, and exceeds the previous 
method proposed in [5] in resisting any collusion between the server and other users. Through extensive experiments, we 
demonstrate that the proposed scheme also signiﬁcantly outperforms the method of [5] , achieving practical execution time 
for a wide spectrum of application settings. 
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